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      Issue 
Has Nibler failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 




Nibler Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Nibler pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of 10 years, with two years fixed.  (R., pp.102-11.)  Nibler filed a notice 
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.116-19.)   
 2 
Nibler asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his alcohol abuse, mental 
health issues, purported remorse, and “lack of criminal intent or premeditation.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-9.)  The record supports the sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The maximum prison sentence for vehicular manslaughter is 15 years.  I.C. § 18-
4007(3)(b).  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with two years 
fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.102-11.)  At sentencing, 
the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and 
also set forth in detail its reasons for imposing Nibler’s sentence.  (Tr., p.29, L.9 – p.36, 
L.17.)  The state submits that Nibler has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for 
 3 
reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, 
which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Nibler’s conviction and 
sentence. 
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1 And I think if you fix a term of three 
2 years, that will give sufficient ability for the 
Department of Corrections to determine if and when 
Mr. Nibler's prepared to be back out in the 
5 community, and hopefully they wouldn't do that until 
6 he has a full understanding of the loss that he 
7 caused, and that he is not the victim here. 
8 With respect to retaining jurisdiction, 
9 that was our original recommendation, it's 
10 concerning and problematic that Mr. Nibler did 
11 violate the conditions of his release. Ultimately we 
12 were originally going to ask for a sentence of 2 to 
13 10, so I think changes in the sentence to 3 to 15 
14 helps acknowledge and respond to the fact that 
15 Mr. Nibler apparently isn't taking this as seriously 
16 as he cou ld and he should. But I think that's a 
17 sufficient reaction to that. I don't think that 
18 that so much weight should be put on that that that 
19 should cause him to go directly to serving his 
20 sentence without the Court retaining jurisdiction. 
21 I certainly understand that's in your 
22 discretion, Judge, and I know there is a lot -- a 
23 lot here. We have great harm, we have a fairly poor 
24 criminal history, it's not as bad as some certainly; 
but when you have got a prior DUI, that's just 
29 
28 
1 doesn't bode well for you if you later end up being 
2 DUI and causing someone's death. 
3 So, again, Judge, we ask that you sentence 
4 him to the 3 to 15 years and retain jurisdiction. 
5 We do believe that is appropriate in this matter. 
6 Thankyou. 
7 TI-IE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cavanaugh. 
8 Anything in response, Ms. Rouse? 
9 MS. ROUSE: Just briefly, your Honor. And 
10 based on my interactions with Mr. Nibler and just 
11 his family this morning, I'd like to say that I 
12 think before he can appreciate fully the depth of 
13 the effect of what happened, he has to appreciate 
14 fully his mental health and his substance abuse 
15 issues. And I think that he is prepared to begin 
16 that journey of understanding himself, and he is 
17 prepared to accept and acknowledge the fact that he 
18 does need some treatment and some programing. 
19 He has s tated to me that he does want 
20 programing. He wants to change who he is because of 
21 what has happened. And, again, I think in order for 
22 him to fully appreciate and be able to express his 
23 remorse that I do believe he has, he has to work 
24 through some other layers of himself first. And I 
25 believe that given the opportuni for a retained 
1 jurisdiction and the therapeutic community, that he 1 
30 
during his period of release, and I think that's an 
aggravating factor as far as whether during the 2 would be able to be successful on that journey. 2 
3 Thank you. 3 
4 TI-IE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Rouse. 4 
5 Does the Defendant have any lawful cause 5 
6 lo show why sentence should not be imposed at this 6 
7 time? 7 
8 MS. ROUSE: No, your Honor. 8 
9 TI-IE COURT: As Mr. Cavanaugh mentioned, 9 
10 the statute that I'm to apply is 19-2521 that sets 10 
11 out the criteria for placing a defendant on 11 
12 probation or imposing imprisonment. 12 
13 In the first set of criteria state the 13 
14 Court shall deal with the person who has been 14 
15 convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of 15 
16 imprisonment, unless having regard to the nature and 16 
17 circumstances of the crime and the history, 17 
18 character and condition of the defendant. It is of 18 
19 the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for 19 
20 protection of the public because the first criteria 20 
21 is one that there is undue risk that during the 21 
period of a suspended sentence or probation, the 22 
defendant will commit another crime. 23 
24 It has been acknowledged Mr. Nibler was 24 
25 doing things that he had been ordered not to do 25 
period of a suspended sentence he would be likely to 
commit another crime having done what he's been told 
not to do while on release. I think that's a 
predictor of him again committing another crime were 
I to suspend his sentence. 
The next criteria is that the defendant is 
need of correctional treatment that can be provided 
most effectively by the commitment to an 
institution. And I do, in fact, find that that 
criteria has been met. 
The next criteria is that a lesser 
sentence w ill depreciate the seriousness of the 
defendant's crime. As Mr. Cavanaugh aptly pointed 
out, this caused the death Mr. Solberg, and that is, 
I think, coloring my view as to the seriousness and 
whether this would - whether a suspended sentence 
or placing the defendant on probation would 
depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime, 
and I think that it would. 
The next criteria is that imprisonment 
will provide appropriate punishment and deterrence 
to the defendant. I can and do find that that 




1 The next criteria is that imprisonment 1 various factors suggest to me that whether he did 
2 will provide an appropriate deterrent for other 2 contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or 
3 persons in the community. I likewise find that that 3 threaten harm, he certainly should have recognized 
criteria has been met. 4 that his criminal conduct would have caused this 
5 The final criteria under that section is 5 harm. We know four hours after the accident that 
6 that the Defendant is a multiple offender or 6 Mr. Nibler's blood alcohol content was .14 which is 
7 professional criminal. Well, I don't find that 7 almost twice what the legal limit is in the state; 
8 Mr. Nibler is a professional criminal; I do find 8 and given the dissipation of alcohol in one's system 
9 that he has had other offenses which should have 9 through the normal rate of metabolism, I think we 
10 given him pause to commit the crime that he 10 can extrapolate that Mr. Nibler's blood alcohol 
11 committed. 11 content was significantly greater than .14 when 
12 The next set of criteria are set out as 12 Mr. Solberg was run over. 
13 grounds while not controlling the discretion of the 13 There was also a headlight out. And 
14 court, shall be a accorded weight in favor of 14 while, Ms. Rouse, you suggested that that's a 
15 avoiding a sentence of imprisonment. The first 15 mitigating factor, I think that's an aggravating 
1G criteria is that the defendant's criminal conduct 16 factor. Here's somebody who is drunk, too much 
17 neither caused, nor threatened harmed. Obviously I 17 alcohol, who is operating a vehicle that isn't 
18 can't find that that criteria has been met since 18 adequately equipped. Perhaps if the headlight had 
19 Mr. Solberg is no longer with us as a result of 19 been working, this accident might never have 
20 Mr. Nibler's actions. 20 happened. So I think that's an aggravating factor 
21 The next criteria is that the Defendant 21 as opposed to a mitigating factor. 
22 did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would 22 And, finally, Mr. Nibler didn't have 
23 cause or threaten harm. It's a more troublesome or 23 driving privileges on the night in question. So 
24 difficult criteria to analyze since it's very 24 here's someone who is drunk too much, driving a 
5 difficult to climb into somebody's mind, but I think 25 poorly equipped vehicle, and doesn't have the lawful 
33 34 
1 ability to drive, so I can't, as I say, get into the 1 criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was 
2 mind of Mr. Nibler, but I can certainly say that he 2 sustained. Clearly I can't find that that can or 
3 should have contemplated that his conduct would have 3 will be made, that that compensation can or will be 
4 caused or threatened harm not just in Mr. Solberg 4 made. Obviously when a life is lost, it's 
5 but to others. 5 irretrievable. 
6 The next criteria is that the defendant 6 The next criteria is that the defendant 
7 acted under a strong provocation; I certainly can't 7 has no history of prior delinquency or criminal 
8 find that that criteria has been met. 8 activity or has led a law abiding life for a 
!:i The next criteria is that there were 9 substantial period of time before the commission of 
10 substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the 10 the present crime; I can't find that that criteria 
11 defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to 11 has been met. 
12 establish a defense; I clearly can't find that has 12 The next criteria is that the defendant's 
13 been met. 13 criminal conduct was the result of circumstances 
14 I also want to go back to those earlier 14 unlikely to recur; I can't find that that criteria 
15 factors that I was talking about having drunk too 15 has been met. 
16 much, driving in a poorly equipped vehicle, and 16 And finally the character and attitudes of 
17 driving without privileges. I think the rate of 17 the defendant indicate that the commission of 
18 speed was higher than what he should have been 18 another crime is unlikely; I also cannot find that 
19 traveling and what was lawfully allowed at the time. 19 that criteria has been met. 
20 The next criteria is that the victim of 20 So analyzing the criteria that I'm obliged 
21 the defendant's criminal conduct induced or 21 to analyze as set out in 19-2521, I find that a term 
facilitated the commission of the crime; I obviously 22 of imprisonment is a more appropriate sentence than 
23 can't find that that has been met. 23 either suspending a sentence or placing Mr. Nibler 
24 The next criteria is that the defendant 24 on probation. 




1 obligation that I have is to determine an 1 facing two years minimum and eight years 
2 appropriate sentence. The original sentence 2 indeterminate. In a very real sense how you perform 
• contemplated in the Rule 11 Agreement was a sentence 3 will determine when you will be eligible for parole . 
of not less than two, nor more than ten years in the 4 I recommend that you seek to participate in the 
5 state penitentiary with the Court retaining 5 therapeutic community and the pathways for success. 
6 jurisdiction. That means that Mr. Nibler would go 6 I can't control what the Department of Corrections 
7 on a rider, and I would know in three to nine months 7 does with you, but I can tell you that you have a 
8 whether the powers that be at at the correctional 8 serious alcohol problem and that serious alcohol 
9 system think that he would be an appropriate 9 problem has resulted in the death of Olai Solberg. 
10 candidate for probation. We all know that that 10 So unless and until you get your alcohol problem 
11 agreement is no longer binding on me because of 11 under control, I think you will likely be in the 
12 Mr. Nibler's actions in the interim. 12 penitentiary for a significant period of time. 
13 So the question I'm faced with is what is 13 I acknowledge that this was a tragic 
14 an appropriate sentence. Mr. Cavanaugh suggested 14 accident, but I also acknowledge that there were 
15 that three to fifteen would be appropriate and 15 significant factors that you had control over that 
16 retaining jurisdiction. I actually think that two 16 led to this tragic accident; and had you acted 
17 to ten is an appropriate sentence, and I'm imposing 17 differently, we would not be here today. 
18 a sentence the not less than two nor more than ten 18 A wise man once said, not even God can 
19 years in the state penitentiary. 19 change yesterday. We can't change our yesterdays. 
20 The real question is whether to retain 20 We can't change what we have done, but we can change 
21 jurisdiction. I think it would under the 21 our future. And my hope is that you will go, you 
22 circumstances depreciate the seriousness of the 22 will learn from this and that you will change. Good 
23 offense by retaining jurisdiction, so I am declining 23 luck 
24 to retain jurisdiction. 24 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
• 
So that means, Mr. Nibler, that you are 25 THE COURT: It's also my obligation to 
37 38 
1 advise you that you have the right to appeal this 1 1 don't know what those are just yet, $270.50 in 
2 decision. If you cannot afford counsel, one can and 2 court costs are imposed. I'm also establishing a 
3 will be appointed for you in the bringing of that 3 priority for the restitution to Mr. Solberg's mother 
4 appeal. 4 and the civil penalty for Mr. Solberg's mother that 
5 The Defendant is remanded to the custody 5 those will be paid before restitution to the crime 
6 of the Latah County Sheriff for imposition of the 6 victim's compensation at the Industrial Commission. 
7 sentence. 7 MR.CAVANAUGH: The other couple of 
8 Is there anything else we need to take up? 8 administrative things, I guess, Judge, we do ask 
9 MR CAVANAUGH: Judge, I did have a couple 9 that you order DNA sample and thumb print 
10 more things. 10 impression. 
11 THE COURT: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Any objection, Ms. Rouse? 
12 MR. CAVANAUGH: One, if you could 12 MS. ROUSE: No objection, your Honor. 
13 address -- 13 THE COURT: And I am signing that. 
14 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm suspending 14 Anything else, Mr. Cavanaugh? 
15 your driving privileges for five years upon your 15 MR. CAVANAUGH: Judge, we move to dismiss 
16 release from the penitentiary, Mr. Nibler. I am 16 Count II, the Driving Without Privileges count. 
17 leaving restitution open; however, I am imposing 17 THE COURT: Hearing no objection, that 
18 restitution for the crime victim's compensation fund 18 request is granted. 
19 in the amount $2,813.79. I'm also imposing a civil 19 Anything else, Ms. Rouse? 
20 fine of $5,000 payable to Mr. Sol berg's mother. 20 MS. ROUSE: No, your Honor. Thank you very 
21 Other things, Mr. Cavanaugh? 21 much. 
' MS. ROUSE: Judge, is there going to be any 22 THE COURT: We are in recess. 
criminal fine and any court costs? I'm not seeking 23 Good luck, Mr. Nibler. 
24 a criminal fine, I just am asking. 24 (Hearing concluded at 1:54 p.m.) 
25 THE COURT: I'm imposing court costs, but 25 
